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Abstract
This note gives a simple proof of the existence and monotonicity of optimal debt contracts in
simple models of borrowing and lending with ex−post asymmetric information, risk−averse
agents and heterogeneous beliefs. Our argument is based on the concept of nondecreasing
rearrangement and on a supermodular version of Hardy−Littlewood inequality.
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Consider a contracting problem between a borrower and a lender subject
to a costly state veriﬁcation (henceforth, CSV (see Townsend(1979)) prob-
lem, that is to say, the project return is costlessly observed by the borrower
while the lender has to pay a monitoring cost. Assuming risk neutrality and
homogenous beliefs, Gale and Hellwig (1985) and Williamson (1986) have
shown that optimal debt contracts among the class of incentive compatible
and individually rational contracts are simple debt contracts where the bor-
rower repays a ﬁxed interest rate whenever possible and the lender seizes
all the proﬁt realized when the borrower defaults. Assuming risk neutrality
but heterogeneous beliefs, Carlier and Renou (2003) have shown that simple
debt contracts do not necessarily survive as optimal contracts. These au-
thors provide a suﬃcient condition for simple debt contracts to be optimal
and show by means of counter-examples that this condition is easily violated.
However, no proof of existence of optimal contracts was provided.
In this note, we go one step further. We prove the existence of optimal
debt contracts without assuming risk neutrality and/or homogeneous beliefs.
It is important to notice that our existence result also holds for the special
cases studied in Gale and Hellwig (1985), Williamson (1986) or Carlier and
Renou (2003). Moreover, we show that optimal contracts are monotone
in that the higher the project return, the higher the repayment from the
borrower to the lender is. On the technical side, our argument essentially
relies on the concept of nondecreasing rearrangement and on a supermodular
version of Hardy-Littlewood inequality; concepts that have been recently in-
troduced in economics by Carlier and Dana (2002, 2003). More precisely, the
main mathematical result we use is as follows: the mathematical expectation
of a function U of two Borel functions x and y increases if we substitute x
and y by their nondecreasing rearrangements ˜ x and ˜ y and if U satisﬁed a su-
permodularity condition.(see Theorem 1 for a precise formulation) We refer
the interested reader to Carlier and Dana (2002, 2003) for more applications
of these concepts.
Section 2 presents a simple CSV model and reviews results from the
rearrangement techniques’ literature. Section 3 proves the existence and
monotonicity of optimal contracts. Finally, section 4 oﬀers some concluding
1remarks.
2. A simple costly state veriﬁcation model
2.1. The model
We consider a simple economy with a unique borrower and a unique
lender. The lender is endowed with a single unit of a good that might be
used for both investment and consumption while the borrower has no initial
wealth. The borrower and the lender are expected utility maximizer with
Bernoulli utility functions u and v, and we assume the following:
(A1) The utility function u and v: R → R+ are concave, increasing, twice
continuously diﬀerentiable.
Moreover, the borrower has access to an investment project requiring
exactly one unit of the good to be undertaken. The project return is a real-
ization ω of the random variable e ω with full support on [0,ω]. Furthermore,
the project return ω is costlessly observable only to the borrower while the
lender has to pay a cost of γ to perfectly monitor the return.
Finally, the borrower and the lender might diﬀer in their beliefs about the
project return. The borrower believes that e ω admits the probability density
function µ while the lender believes in ν. Density functions are common
knowledge and continuous. In addition, we assume that the borrower be-
lieves the project proﬁtable, that is
R ω
0 ωµ(ω)dω > u(0), and that one of the
following holds
(A2) (resp, (A2’)) The function LR(·) : ω 7→ LR(ω) :=
µ(ω)
ν(ω) is diﬀeren-
tiable and for all (ω,v) ∈ [0,ω]2 the following condition is satisﬁed:
−u
00(ω − v)LR(ω) − u
0(ω − v)LR
0(ω) ≥ 0.(resp, > 0.)
Condition (A2) (resp, (A2’)) simply states that the Arrow-Pratt coeﬃcient
of absolute risk aversion for the borrower is greater (resp, strictly greater)
than the diﬀerential version of the likelihood ratio. In particular, (A2) holds
in the special case of risk neutrality and homogenous beliefs or in the case of
a monotone likelihood ratio (i.e., LR0(ω) ≤ 0,∀ω.)
Since the borrower has access to a high return project but does not have
the wealth to undertake the project, he can propose a debt contract to the
lender, as deﬁned below.





2• b R : [0,ω] → R+, ω 7→ b R(ω) is the repayment in state ω,
• b R(ω) ≤ ω, ∀ω ∈ [0,ω], the limited liability constraint,
• M ⊂ [0,ω], a subset of [0,ω] where monitoring takes place.




is truthtelling if and only if ∀ω ∈
[0,ω], ∀ω0 / ∈ M,
b R(ω) ≤ b R(ω
0).
A debt contract is thus said to be truthtelling when the borrower has
no incentive to misreport the project return. Without loss of generality,
we restrict ourselves to the class of debt contracts which satisfy the direct
revelation mechanism (see Townsend (1988)) and are truthtelling. Note that
if (b R,M) is truthtelling, then b R has to be constant on [0,ω] \ M, say with
value R, and obviously:1
{b R(·) < R} ⊆ M ⊂ {b R(·) ≤ R}.
Changing (b R,M) into the new truthtelling contract (b R,{b R(·) < R}) is there-
fore weakly Pareto improving since this transformation does not increase
the expected monitoring cost. Hence, a truthtelling contract is simply de-
termined by a pair (R(·),R) where the threshold R determines monitoring
states M = {R(·) < R} and 0 ≤ R(ω) ≤ ω for all ω ∈ [0,ω].
2.2. The borrower’s program
Given a contract (R(·),R), the borrower’s expected payoﬀ is
Z
{R(·)<R}
u(ω − R(ω))µ(ω)dω +
Z
{R(·)≥R}




while the lender’s expected payoﬀ is
Z
{R(·)<R}







1Hereafter, we denote {b R(·) < R} for the set {ω ∈ [0,ω] : b R(ω) < R}, etc.
3Since the lenders reservation utility is v(1), a contract (R(·),R) is accepted




v(min(R(ω),R) − γ1{R(·)<R})ν(ω)dω ≥ v(1). (1)
Deﬁnition 3 A contract (R(·),R) is admissible if it satisﬁes the participa-
tion constraint (1) and
0 ≤ R(ω) ≤ ω, for all ω ∈ [0,ω].






u(ω − min(R(ω),R))µ(ω)dω, (2)
subject to (R(·),R) being admissible.
(A3) The set of admissible contracts (R(·),R) is nonempty.
2.3. Rearrangement inequalities and supermodularity
This section brieﬂy reviews the rearrangement techniques introduced by
Carlier and Dana (2002, 2003) in economics. We refer the interested reader to
their work and the references cited therein for the proofs and further results
(see also Carlier (2003) for more advanced results).
Let m be a probability measure on [0,ω]. Assume that m is absolutely
continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure and that it admits a con-
tinuous and positive density µ on [0,ω].
Deﬁnition 4 Two Borel functions on [0,ω], x and y are equimeasurable
with respect to m if and only if they fulﬁll one of the following equivalent
conditions:
1. m(x−1(B)) = m(y−1(B)) for every Borel subset B of R,







Proposition 1 Let m be as previously and R be any real-valued Borel func-
tion on [0,ω]. Then there exists a unique right-continuous nondecreasing
function, e R, which is equimeasurable to R with respect to m.
4e R is called the nondecreasing rearrangement of R with respect to the
probability measure m. A key result of the rearrangement techniques is the
celebrated Hardy-Littlewood inequality. Such inequalities state that integral
of the form Z ω
0
L(x(ω),y(ω))dm(ω)
increases when we substitute the arbitrary functions x(·) and y(·) by their
nondecreasing rearrangements e x(·) and e y(·) and L satisﬁed a supermodularity
condition, as deﬁned below.
Deﬁnition 5 Let L be a function : R × R → R. L is called supermodular
(respectively strictly supermodular) if for all (x,h) ∈ R × R+:
y 7→ [L(x + h,y) − L(x,y)]
is nondecreasing (respectively increasing) on R.
It is worth noting that if L is C2(R×R,R), then a necessary and suﬃcient
condition for L to be supermodular is that the cross-derivative ∂2
xyL is non-
negative. In other words, L satisﬁes the so-called Spence-Mirlees single cross-
ing condition. A few examples of supermodular functions are L(x,y) = xy,
L(x,y) = U(x−y) with U concave or L(x,y) = g(x+y) with g convex. (see
Topkis (1998, p43) for further examples of supermodular functions)
Theorem 1 Let L be a continuous and supermodular function. Let x and y
be two real-valued Borel functions deﬁned on [0,ω] and e x(·) and e y(·) be their
nondecreasing rearrangement with respect to m. We have
Z ω
0




provided that the right-hand side of this inequality is well-deﬁned. Further-
more if L is strictly modular and x is increasing then the previous inequality
is an equality if and only if y = e y.
Finally, since most optimization problems in economics are constrained,
we should pay attention to the stability of the set of constraints (typically,
equality and inequality constraints) under nondecreasing rearrangements.
Lemma 1 Let x be any real-valued Borel function deﬁned on [0,ω] and let
e x be its nondecreasing rearrangement with respect to m. Let f and g be two
nondecreasing functions: [0,ω] → R. If f ≤ x ≤ g m − a.e., then f ≤ e x ≤ g
m − a.e..
53. Existence and monotonicity
Lemma 2 Assume (A1),(A2). Let (R(·),R) be a admissible contract and
let e R be the nondecreasing rearrangement of R with respect to ν(ω)dω. Then
(e R(·),R) is admissible and U(e R(·),R) ≥ U(R(·),R). If, in addition, (A2’)
holds, this inequality is strict unless min(R(·),R) = min(e R(·),R).
Proof. Let (R(·),R) be a admissible contract and let e R be the nondecreas-
ing rearrangement of R with respect to ν(ω)dω. First observe that since
0 ≤ R(ω) ≤ ω, we have 0 ≤ e R(ω) ≤ ω by Lemma 1. By equimeasurability of
R and e R with respect to ν(ω)dω, V (e R(·),R) = V (R(·),R) hence (e R(·),R) is
admissible.
Finally, by assumption (A2), the function (ω,v) 7→ u(ω−v)LR(ω) is super-








u(ω − min(R(ω),R))LR(ω)ν(ω)dω = U(R(·),R).
If, in addition, (A2’) holds, then the function (ω,v) 7→ u(ω − v)LR(ω)
is strictly supermodular. By Theorem 1, it follows that the previous in-
equality is strict unless min(R(·),R) is nondecreasing i.e. min(R(·),R) =
min(e R(·),R).
Thus, from Lemma 2, monotonicity is a necessary optimality condition for
the borrower’s program. We can therefore assume without loss of generality
that the repayment function is nondecreasing i.e., R(·) is nondecreasing.
Theorem 2 Assume (A1),(A2), (A3). The borrower’s program (2) has a
solution (R∗(·),R
∗
) with R∗(·) nondecreasing on [0,ω]. If, in addition, (A2’)
holds, then any solution (R∗(·),R
∗
) to the borrower’s program is nondecreas-
ing on {R∗(·) < R
∗
}.
Proof. Let (Rn(·),Rn)n be a maximizing sequence of (2). From Lemma
2, we can replace Rn(·) by its nondecreasing rearrangement with respect to
ν(ω)dω. From the uniform boundedness of (Rn(·))n and Helly’s selection
Theorem (see Appendix) some subsequence of (Rn(·))n (not relabeled) con-
verges pointwise to some nondecreasing function R∗(·). Similarly we may





limited liability constraint and Lebesgue’s dominated convergence Theorem
implies that U(R∗(·),R
∗
) is the value of problem (2). It remains to prove
that (R∗(·),R
∗
) satisﬁes the participation constraint. First note that:
1{R∗(·)<R






∗}) ≥ limsupv(min(Rn(·),Rn) − γ1{Rn(·)<Rn}).
Applying Fatou’s Lemma, it follows that (R∗(·),R
∗
) solves (2).
If, in addition, (A2’) holds, then Lemma 2 implies that any solution (R∗(·),R
∗
)
of the borrower’s program satisﬁes min(R(·),R) = min(e R(·),R) hence is non-




To conclude, we give a few remarks and hint further research. As has
been already noticed, if we assume risk-neutrality (u = v = Id with Id :
[0,ω] → [0,ω], ω 7→ ω) and homogeneous beliefs (µ = ν), then optimal debt





and Hellwig (1985) or Williamson (1986)) However, assuming risk-neutrality
but heterogeneous beliefs, Carlier and Renou (2003) have shown that simple
debt contracts do not necessarily survive as optimal contracts. These authors
provide a suﬃcient condition for simple debt contracts to be optimal and
show by means of counter-examples that this condition is easily violated.
Our existence and monotonicity result is certainly a ﬁrst step towards a
complete characterization of optimal debt contracts in a CSV model with
risk-aversion and heterogeneity of beliefs, but further research is still needed.
It is believed that obtaining further analytical results would be extremely
diﬃcult, if not out of reach, and that numerical analysis might give more
insights. Finally, it is hoped that rearrangement techniques would prove to
be fruitful for solving other optimization problems.
75. Appendix: Helly selection Theorem
We recall a compactness property of nondecreasing functions due to Helly.
(see for instance Natanson (1955))
Theorem 3 Let (xn)n∈N be a uniformly bounded sequence of nondecreasing
functions on [0,ω]. Then there exists a nondecreasing function x deﬁned on
[0,ω] and a subsequence, again denoted (xn)n∈N, which converges pointwise
to x on [0,ω].
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